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Consequences of Third Party Observers' Perceptions of Labor Disputes: 




This study examined third party observers' fairness judgments of the reasons and the 
procedures used during labor negotiations and their retributive intentions towards the 
employer as prospective employees and clients, as well as their retributive intentions and 
support for strike. Participants (n = 248) were randomly assigned to 1 of 16 conditions 
representing a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  design: the Fairness of the Demands (unfair vs. fair) X the 
Seriousness of the Negotiations (not serious vs. serious) X Type of Dispute (strike vs. 
lockout) X Type of Sector (private/construction workers and public/nurses). The general 
union attitude scale was also added to the study as a covariate. Third party observers 
reported higher perceptions of distributive and procedural justice when they were placed 
in conditions representing fair demands and fair procedures. Observers also reported 
higher levels of support for strike when they were presented with a fair reason for the 
underlying dispute and higher levels of retributive intentions towards the employer when 
either party did not seriously negotiate.
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Consequences ofThird Party Observers' Perceptions of Labor Disputes:
An Examination of Distributive and Procedural Justice 
Media coverage, be it via television, newspapers, or magazines, has long been 
known to influence the public's perception of unions and organizations (Schmidt, 1993; 
Walsh, 1988). Recently, labor disputes have received an increased amount of media 
attention due to the public's fascination with confrontations between these two parties 
(Flynn, 2000). More often than not the media tends to project a negative image of the 
organized labor movement (Puette, 1992). Interesting as it may seem, there is very little 
research that examines how media coverage influences the public's perceptions and 
actions towards the union and the employer who are involved in labor dispute. Past labor 
negotiation research has typically been geared towards those who are directly involved 
with the situation: the employer, the union and its members. Yet very little attention has 
been given to how third party observers, such as the public, develop their perceptions of 
the union and the employer during labor disputes.
Third party observers are individuals who are not directly associated with the 
outcomes, but are still in a position to make a judgment about the fairness of a situation 
(Skarlicki, Ellard, & Kelln, 1998). A lthou^ these individuals are not directly associated 
with the situation or the fnal outcome, as they are not employed by the organization or 
members of its union, they are still an important asset to organizations and unions. After 
all, they represent prospective clients, employees, and union members. Since these 
individuals are not directly associated with the union or the organization, they will likely 
develop their opinions of these two parties based on the information that they receive via 
the media Thus the image that is projected via the media can influence third party
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observers' opinions, which in turn can influence their behaviors towards the union and 
the organization. These behaviors can be crucial to the wellbeing of organizations and 
unions.
The public image of organizations and unions can have an important role in 
determining whether these parties meet with success or failure (Leung, Chiu, & Au, 
1993). Obviously, a negative public image can have serious repercussions for either 
party. A negative image projected by the media may influence a third party observer's 
retributive intentions towards the employer and the union and these intentions may 
negatively influence both parties' prosperity.
A tarnished organizational image can potentially diminish an organization's 
proGts and stock values, its public approval rate and its present and future work force. 
Martha Stewart's organization, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, represents an 
excellent example of how bad press can have a tremendous impact on an organization's 
image and stock value. Before Martha Stewart was accused of insider treading, her 
company's stock was selling at $19.23 a share; following her highly publicized 
indictment, her company's stock value had dropped to a little over $9.00 a share, a 
decline of around 51 percent within a one year time Game (ABC news.com, 2003). This 
is just one example of how the press can influence an organization's proGts.
During labor negotiations, organizations also receive a signiGcant amount of 
media attendon (Flynn, 2000). Third party observers are placed in a context where they 
can take infbrmadon provided by the media and use it to develop either a posidve or
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negative perception of the organization. More important, third party observers are given 
sufficient information in the media to judge whether an organization is treating its 
employees in a fair and decent manner or if it is trying to take advantage of them. 
Organizations that mistreat their employees during labor negotiations may actually be 
creating a public image that will hinder their future selection and recruitment efforts.
After all, how many people want to work for an organization that mistreats its 
employees? Recruitment and selection can be extremely costly for organizations (Cascio, 
1982; Darmon, 1990; Hall, 1981). When an organization has a tarnished image, 
recruitment and selection become even more expensive as the organization may have 
difhculties attracting above-average workers.
An organization's image becomes even more important ̂ e n  considering recent 
labor shortages. Canada's unemployment rate has recently reached near-record lows and 
certain sectors have even been forced to increase wages to keep up with labor demand 
(Statistics Canada, 2002). Because so many people are presently employed, it is more 
difficult for organizations to recruit high-performing employees. One way of overcoming 
this obstacle is to project a positive organizational image. Companies who treat their 
employees fairly will not have as much difGculty recruiting new employees as companies 
with a tarnished image, because individuals want to work for companies that treat them 
well. It is highly doubtful that an individual, as a prospective employee or chent, would 
want to deal with an organization that is known for mistreating its employees. Dealing 
with labor negotiations in a fair and decent manner can possibly help organizations 
overcome some of these recruitment problems as the organization will be projecting a 
positive image to third party observers. Consequently, this positive image should
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increase the candidate pool and diminish the necessity of hiring head-hunters/recruiters to 
find candidates to fill empty positions. From a long term perspective, projecting a 
positive and fair image could potentially decrease the cost associated with recruitment.
Over the past twenty years, the North American labor movement has witnessed a 
steady decline in membership. Goeghegan (1991) would go so f ^  as to suggest that this 
decline is an understatement and that the labor movement has in fact become obsolete in 
today's post-industrial, service-sector economy. A m^or challenge facing unions has 
been to recruit new members in the service-sector (Kelloway, Barling, & Harvey, 1998). 
Although unions have a high concentration of members in the governmental service- 
sector, it has yet to capitalize on the private service-sector (Galameau, 1996). The 
private sector is largely composed of part-time employees (Belanger & Murray, 1994) 
and as Kumar (1993) noted, unions have been relatively unsuccessful in organizing a 
labor movement for these employees.
Authors have linked the union's recruitment problems to numerous factors, 
including organizations placing more emphasis on human resources which has changed 
the nature of labor-management relations (Kelloway et al., 1998) and/or employers using 
part-time work as a way to avoid unions (Nollen, 1982). Another overlooked factor that 
could have an affect on these recruitment problems is how third party observers develop 
their perceptions of unions. As third party observers are not directly associated with 
unions, they may have no other way to develop their opinions of them than through the 
media. Unfortunately, unions tend to receive heightened media attention when they are 
in labor negotiations with management (Flynn, 2000) and they are also more apt to be
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portrayed negatively by the media (Puette, 1992). Rarely do labor unions receive any 
media attention outside of labor negotiations (Flynn, 2000). Third party observers, who 
are placed in a context where the media depicts the union as requesting unreasonable 
demands during the negotiations or who have commenced an illegal strike, may develop 
a negative perception of the union. If these individuals are placed in a context where they 
can vote for a union, they may be unwilling to do so because they have developed 
negative pre-conceptions about unions.
Image is certainly important to the recruitment procedures of organizations and 
unions. However, public image may be even more crucial for unions as opposed to 
organizations, especially during labor disputes.
Unions recognize the importance of their public image. Before and during 
negotiations, unions will invest time and money into developing media campaigns that 
inform the public of the facts surrounding the present dispute. By transmitting this 
information they hope to build public support for the union during their strike. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about what type of effects these media campaigns 
have on third party observers.
Third party observers' attitudes towards labor disputes can play an important role 
in the final outcome for the union and the organization. Kelloway, Francis, and Catano 
(2003) provided two reasons why public support is essential to unions and organizations 
prior to and during these negotiations. First, unions and organizations will take the time 
before and during the dispute to express the legitimacy of their position to the public, 
while expressing the other party's unreasonable demands. The union frequently tries to
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gather public support by passing out flyers to the public, informing them that their strike 
is legal and of good cause. Unions will also direct time and money into creating media 
campaigns. For example, the Canadian Association of University Teachers emphasized 
the need for faculty associations on strike to obtain public support for a quick resolution 
of the dispute (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 1996).
Public support becomes even more important if the strike takes place in a public 
sector context. Public sector strikes can have tremendous consequences on individuals 
who are not involved in the dispute but who will be directly affected by it. For example, 
when municipal public transportation employees go on strike thousands of citizens can be 
left without means of transportation. A more recent example can be taken hrom the city 
of Toronto where garbage disposal employees went on strike in the summer of 2002. The 
strike lasted several weeks and citizens were left helpless to watch their roads and parks 
become bombarded with garbage. Obviously citizens who depend on such services can 
become hustrated if these strikes become prolonged. This ûustration can be directed 
towards the employer (the government) or the union, whomever the public holds 
accountable for the ongoing strike. Negative attitudes towards governmental parties can 
be extremely hazardous to their approval ratings, especially during an electoral year.
A second reason that third party observers are so important to strike action is that 
unions believe that the success of a strike will largely depend on the amount of public 
support (Kelloway et al., 2003). Employees on strike not only refuse to report to work, 
but they also actively try to disrupt their employer's daily business activities by setting up 
picket lines in 6ont of their employer's ofGces. Moreover, as striking employees walk 
these picket hnes, it is not uncommon for them to be joined by other union members in a
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show of solidarity. Members of the public may even join these lines or honk their homs 
as they pass them in a show of support for striking union members. Other individuals or 
union members may even choose to write a letter to their government ofGcials or to local 
newspapers expressing their ûustration with the employer for not resolving the dispute 
more quickly. Such support 6om members of the general public can possibly encourage 
union members' morale and may even affect the duration and outcome of the strike. In 
addition, support &om third party observers can exert pressure on government ofGcials to 
assign an external mediator to help resolve the dispute more quickly. Leung et al. (1993) 
have even stated that both parties may succumb and resolve the strike more quickly due 
to intense public support.
Obviously public support is an important factor in determining the final outcome 
of a strike, but there is veiy little known about how the public decides whether they are 
going to support the union or the employer. Third party observers receive sufGcient 
information via the media to develop an opinion on the union and the organization. The 
media depicts several factors during labor negotiations that can influence third party 
observers' retributive intentions towards the organization and union, as well as their level 
of support for the union. These factors include perceptions of the fairness of the demands 
and the seriousness of the negotiations, or in scientific terms, elements of organizational 
justice, both distributive justice (i.e., the 6imess of the demands) and procedural justice 
(i.e., the fairness of the procedures used during the negotiations, such as if the 
negotiations are serious or not serious), the type of dispute (i.e., strike or lockout), and the 
type of sector (i.e., white collar/public vs. blue collar/private). Surprisingly, there is very
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little research that examines the impact that these factors have on third party observers' 
perceptions of unions and organizations.
Over the last decade, organizational justice has received an increased amount of 
attention in the fields of industrial/organizational psychology, human resource 
management, and organizational behavior (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). 
Organizational justice can be defined as how individuals perceive and react to fairness in 
organizations. Individuals will have their own perceptions of the organization, making 
their perceptions completely subjective. Organizational justice is not only subjective; it 
is also a social construct as the individuals will collectively determine whether an 
organization's actions are fair (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; 
Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997).
As noted in Colquitt et al. (2001), scientific research examines two different 
types of fairness perceptions that individuals may have towards organizations: (a) 
distributive justice which examines the fairness of the final outcome distributions 
(Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976) and (b) procedural 
justice which examines the fairness of the procedures used to achieve the final outcome 
(Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Thibault & Walker, 1975). Past 
research has tried to hnk perceptions of organizational justice to numerous organizational 
outcomes, including organizational commitment, withdrawal, job satisfaction, and 
organizational citizenship behavior (Colquitt et al., 2001). Most of these studies are 
based on employees' perceptions of their organization; very few of these studies examine 
how third party observers perceive an organization. Third party observers, thanks to the
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media, are placed in a position where they can subjectively determine whether a 
judgment was fair or unfair by examining the reasons underlying the labor negotiations 
(i.e., distributive justice) and by examining the fairness of the procedures used during the 
bargaining period, in other words whether the negotiations were serious or not serious 
(i.e., procedural justice).
Distributive justice stems &om the social exchange theory (Adams, 1965). 
According to this theory, individuals are more concerned about the degrees of fairness of 
the final outcome as opposed to the amount of the 6nal outcome. Adams believed that 
individuals could decide whether an outcome was fair or unfair by examining the ratio of 
one's contributions to one's outcomes and then comparing this ratio to another ratio in 
the same context. Comparing one ratio to another similar ratio is the basis for Adam's 
equity theory. Adams suggested that individuals will be motivated to avoid tense 
situations where these ratios are unequal. Although this is an objective theory, Adams 
was very clear in stating that its entire process was subjective, as it is based on an 
individual's perceptions of what actions are considered fair or unfair. Studies examining 
distributive justice have demonstrated that there are negative consequences for 
organizations whose employees perceive that they are being rewarded unfairly for their 
work (Colquitt et al., 2001).
Distributive injustice has been associated with such negative outcomes as a 
decline in work performance (Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) and 
higher rates of turnover and absenteeism (Hulin, 1991; Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & 
Shalit, 1992). During layoff procedures, employees who were not given an opportunity
Perceptions of Labor Disputes 10
to voice their opinions reported lower levels of distributive justice and higher levels of 
retributive intentions towards the employer (Skarlicki et al., 1988; Veinotte, 2001). All 
of these outcomes, which are extremely expensive for an organization, are actions that 
are committed by the organization's employees. There are very few studies that examine 
what type of effects distributive iiyustice has on third party observers during labor 
negotiations. Third party observers who perceive an organization as treating its 
employees unfairly could possibly boycott the organization or create public support for 
the employee's union.
In some disputes, third party observers are given sufGcient information via the 
media to determine whether the ratio of contribuGons (i.e., competencies, skills, and 
hours worked) that employees give to their organizaGon is equivalent to the outcomes 
(i.e., salary and beneSts) that they receive from it. It should be noted that the media 
mostly portrays a negaGve image of the orgainzed labor movement (Puette, 1992), which 
in turn can influence how third party observers perceive the union. If the media reported 
a labor dispute (f-ee Grom bias or distorGon) where employees are receiving wages that 
are far below average for that type of work, then third party observers will likely see the 
organizaGon as taking advantage of its employees. In this scenario, third party observers 
should demonstrate higher levels of support for the union and higher levels of retribuGve 
intenGons towards the organizaGon:
Fmr/ AjyofA&yü: Third party observers will report higher levels of distribuGve 
jusGce for the party in a labor dispute whose reasons for its posiGon are seen as fair.
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Third party observers will report higher levels of support and 
lower levels of retributive intentions towards the party in a labor dispute whose demands 
are seen as fair.
Thibault and Walker (1975) first introduced the processes involved in 
organizational justice while examining how disputants reacted to legal procedures.
During legal procedures it is relatively common to have third parties as mediators or 
arbitrators. Thibault and Walker (1975) examined the procedures and decisions that are 
involved in these mediations (i.e., mediator is assigned to the negotiations to assist both 
parties in settling the dispute) and arbitrations (i.e., sole arbitrator is selected by both 
parties or by a minister to resolve the dispute). They suggested that disputants had a 
certain amount of influence or control during the arbitration/mediation stages, but that 
disputants would be willing to give up their control during the decision stage as long as 
the processes used during the mediation/arbitration were fair. In other words, disputants 
had a tendency to perceive the Gnal decision as fair as long as they had a certain amount 
of control over the mediation processes (e.g., they were given a fair opportunity to 
present their arguments with sufhcient time during the mediation). When people are 
given an opportunity to express their views and opinions during the mediation process, 
they are said to have a "voice" in the final decision (e.g., Folger, 1977; Lind & Tyler, 
1988).
Leventhal and his colleagues took the concept of procedural justice and applied it 
to such non-legal settings as organizations (Colquitt et al., 2001). Leventhal (1976, 1980; 
Leventhal et al., 1980) suggested that voice is only one of many factors that can
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determine whether a process is fair or unfair. In order for a process to be fair, Leventhal 
argued that it must be 6ee from bias, applied consistently, correctable, accurate, 
representative of all concerns, and based on existing ethical standards (Colquitt et al., 
2001). Although research on procedural justice has evolved over the years, it can still be 
deSned as how an individual perceives the fairness of the processes used to determine the 
outcomes of a specific situation, regardless of the Avorability of the outcome (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler 1987).
Procedural justice has been linked to numerous positive outcomes for 
organizations, including making employees more apt to accept disciplinary actions (Ball, 
Trevino, & Sims, 1994) and pay Breezes (Schaubroeck, May, & Brown, 1994). It comes 
as no surprise that organizations that use fair procedures are more likely to have their 
employees accept their decisions in comparison to those who use unfair procedures. The 
fact that employees are more likely to accept these decisions can save organizations a 
great deal of money, such as a decrease in employee theft (Greenberg, 1990).
More importantly, employees will use their experience with fair or unfair 
procedures 6"om the organization to determine how they perceive their organization as a 
whole (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Organizations that use fair procedures, as 
opposed to unfair ones, are more likely to develop strong relationships with their 
employees, consequently increasing their employees' loyalty to the organization and their 
willingness to work on its behalf (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Employees who perceive their 
organization as using fair procedures, as opposed to unfair ones, are more likely to 
exhibit greater trust in management (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), display higher levels of 
organizational commitment (Tyler, 1991), have lower likelihoods of litigation (Bies &
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Tyler, 1993), exhibit lower turnover intentions (Dailey & Kirk, 1992), and have more 
general citizenship behavior (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Organ & Moorman, 1993). All of 
these ûndings have important implications for organizations that can help them deal with 
pay increases or 6eezes, promotions, and disciplinary actions, yet very little is known 
about how employees react to unfair procedures during labor negotiations. The only 
research that has been done in a similar context pertains to layoffs.
When organizations use fair procedures during layoff (e.g., providing employees 
with regular and accurate information), the employees tend to report lower levels of 
procedural injustice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Brockner, Dewit, Grover, & Reed, 1990;
Folger, RosenGeld & Robinson, 1983; Shapiro, 1991). As a result, individuals who 
perceive the situation more fairly reported lower levels of retributive intentions towards 
the employer (Rousseau & Anton, 1998; Veinotte, 2001). Again, providing employees 
with sufficient information regarding layoff procedures seems to diminish negative 
consequences to the employer. Surprisingly, there are very few studies that examine the 
impact of procedural justice elements on labor negotiations or on third party observers' 
perceptions of labor negotiations.
During labor negotiations, one party is required to voice their demands clearly as 
the other party takes the time to seriously listen and consider these demands before 
accepting or refusing them, or presenting counter proposals to which the Grst party re 
evaluates. This is represents a simplistic view of labor negotiations, but it does 
emphasize that the these procedures contain elements of procedural justice, such as 
giving one party an opportunity to "voice" their concerns, giving them sufficient time to 
voice these concerns, and ensuring that both parties have an opportunity to re-submit
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their demands (Leventhal et al., 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975; 
Tyler, 1987).
With the media attention that labor negotiations often receive, third party 
observers are placed in a position to make fairness judgments of the situation. Third 
party observers, based on the media coverage, can judge whether both parties received 
sufficient and accurate information from one another, whether they were given an equal 
opportunity to voice their concerns and demands, whether their demands were seriously 
taken into consideration, and whether all concerned parties had an opportunity to appeal 
the decision. All of these are factors of procedural justice (Leventhal et al., 1980; Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1987).
A procedurally just labor negotiation could be characterized in terms of the two 
parties seriously negotiating with one another and taking the time to listen and consider 
their mutual demands. If an employer did not take the time to seriously listen to the 
union's demands, then third party observers may perceive the employer as unfair and 
taking advantage of its employees. In this scenario, third party observers should 
demonstrate higher levels of support for the union and higher levels of retributive 
intentions towards the organization.
7% W  Third party observers who perceive either the union or the
employer to use fair procedures during the labor dispute (e.g., both parties seriously 
negotiated and made several concessions before being unable to find an agreement) will 
report higher levels of procedural justice.
f  owrfA Third party observers who perceive either the union or the
employer to use unfair negotiation procedures (e.g., the union or the employer were
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unwilling to modify their position during negotiations), will offer more support for the 
party that was treated unfairly and express more retributive intentions towards the other 
party.
q/" Düpu/e
If unions and organizations are unable to come to a mutual agreement during the 
negotiations, two types of outcomes can arise, a strike or a lockout. A strike is a common 
agreement amongst employees to stop working, or refuse to work in order to disrupt their 
employer's daily activities and ou^uts. In order for a strike to occur, the m^ority of the 
union's members must agree, by secret vote/ballot, that the employer's offer is 
unsatisfactory. For a strike to be deemed legal the union officials must administer the 
strike vote prior to actively striking and the union ofdcials are also obliged to give a 
written notice to the organization prior to the strike (Human Resource Development 
Canada, 2002).
A lockout happens when the enqiloyer cannot agree a mutual consensus with the 
union, and to conqxl their employees to accept their terms of employment opts to close 
their organization, suspend their employees &om working, and stop employing a number 
of their employees. In order for a lockout to take place, the employer must hold a secret 
ballot vote among the organization's board of directors and the mzyority of the board 
must vote in favor of a lockout For a lockout to be legal the enqiloyer has to hold this 
secret vote prior to locking out its employees and it must also written notice to the union 
prior to the lockout (Human Resource Development Canada, 2002).
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Strikes and lockouts can be extremely costly for society, organizations and 
employees. Repercussions &om strikes and lockouts can have significant eSects on the 
economy. For example, the American economy suffered a loss of $2 billion a day when 
Pacific Maritime Association, a company that owns several commercial ports in 
America's west coast, opted to lock out its port workers in the fall of 2002 (CofBn,
2002).
From an organizational perspective, strikes can be financially devastating for an 
organization, as they may lose a significant amount of money during all three strike 
phases (i.e., pre-strike, strike, and post-strike). Organizations risk losing money due to 
diminished productivity, lost contracts, lost proGts, wasted executive time, loss of 
clientele and low retention amongst employees (Imberman, 1979). Long after a strike is 
resolved, a company can still feel its financial impact Gom paying legal fees, closing 
plants, and repairing damaged equipment that has been sabotaged by bitter employees 
(Bluen, 1994). Strikes can also create some Gnancial insecurity among the companies 
shareholders. Davidson, Worrel, and Garrison (1988) note that it is not uncommon for a 
company's share price to drop signiGcantly as soon as a union publicly declares that it 
will strike; often these shares do not recover until long aAer the strike has ended. In fact, 
Becker and Olson (1986) noted that a strike can diminish an organizaGon's shareholder 
equity by 4.1% (on average). Strikes can also inGuence the industrial relaGon climate 
between management and labor (Bluen, 1994). AAer an air trafGc controller strike. 
Bowers (1983) reported a negaGve organizaGonal climate between employees and 
management.
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From a personal perspective, strikes and lockouts can also have significant 
effect on employees. As an organization's employees do not normally work during a 
labor disputes, it is not uncommon for them to suffer some type of financial loss 
(Gennard, 1982). More important, labor disputes can be extremely stressful for 
employees as they deal with conflict and change (Bluen & Barling, 1988). Thus, it is not 
uncommon for employees to suffer a great deal of psychological distress during labor 
disputes. There can be little doubt that organizations and union members can suffer 
tremendous financial and psychological consequences due to prolonged labor dispute; 
however, these disputes can also have a tremendous impact on third party observers.
Although they are not directly associated with the dispute, some third party 
observers become incredibly inconvenienced due to strikes and lockouts when they are 
no longer receiving services that they rely on. Take, for example, individuals who are 
forced to withdraw 6om healthcare services due to an ongoing strike or dispute. As 
Bluen (1994) noted, care giver strikes do not seem to influence individuals who receive 
critical treatments, as these patients are generally given an alternative arrangement during 
the strike. Unfortunately, care giver strikes seem more likely to affect individuals who 
are not diagnosed with a critical illness, as these individuals are not given any alternative 
services and are forced to wait until the strikes have ended to receive medical attention. 
Since the majority of third party observers will likely be able to 6nd another alternative 
for the crucial services that they require, it is highly doubtful that they will perceive the 
union or the organization negatively. On the other hand, during the Major League 
Baseball Players' Strike of 1994-1995 certain individuals became so irritated with the 
strike that they were prepared to boycott the games if the season was to resume (Mellor,
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Paley, & Holzworth, 1999). Public support for a strike or a lockout can be crucial in 
determining the duration of a dispute. Very little research, if any, has been done to 
examine whether the type of dispute, a strike or a lockout, wiH influence the amount of 
public support or retributive intentions towards the union and organization 6om third 
party observers.
gway/foM 7: Will the type of dispute, a strike or a lockout, influence 
third party observers' retributive intentions towards the organization or the union and 
support for the union?
fwbh'c fnvatg j'ector Dfjgwtes 
Labor negotiations can take place in two types of settings, the public service 
sector and the private sector. The pubhc sector can be deGned as all individuals who are 
employed by the government, be it federal, provincial, or municipal. The public sector 
has a long list of employees, which includes politicians, social service workers, military 
personnel, police ofBcers, psychiatrists, doctors, and nurses (just to name a few). It 
should be noted that this sector has an extremely high rate of unionized employees. The 
pubhc service sector represents 75 % of all unionized employees in Canada (Galameau, 
1996). The private sector, on the other hand, is mostly composed of non-unionized 
employees who work for private organizations. Pharmacist, bank and grocery clerks, 
waitresses, and construction workers are amongst a long list of examples of individuals 
who are employed by the private sector.
People rely on public and private sector services on a daily basis. Although both 
types of services are important to individuals, services provided by the public sector may 
have a greater impact on a greater number of people. For example, there is a greater
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chance that far more individuals would be inconvenienced if health care (e.g., doctors, 
nurses) or educational workers (e.g., high school teachers) were to go on strike, than if a 
local construction company or transportation company (e.g., truck drivers) were to go on 
strike. This is because there are other construction or transportation companies that are 
not on strike that can provide their services to the public, whereas there are fewer 
alternatives to public services.
Public support for a strike may depend on the reasons underlying the dispute. 
There can be little doubt that services provided by public sector nurses would have a 
greater impact on a greater number of people then private sector services. The public 
recognizes that nurses and doctors receive a high salary; however, they also recognize 
that hospitals in Canada are understaffed, forcing nurses and doctors to work 
tremendously long hours. Thus, if third party observers recognize that both nurses and 
construction workers are underpaid, they will report higher levels of support for the 
nurses as they can be directly affected if they cannot receive health care services. Public 
support may depend on the reasons underlying the dispute, but one thing is certain, there 
can be two types of public reactions to a strike or a lockout. First, third party observers 
may openly support the strike or the lockout, supporting the employees or the 
organization, or just hoping for a quick resolution so that they may continue receiving 
their services; or secondly, they may openly object to the dispute by boycotting the 
organization or the union. Very little research, if any, has examined whether the type of 
profession will influence how third party observers' perceive the organization and the 
union.
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2: Will the sector, public (i.e., one involving nurses) or private 
(i.e., one involving construction workers), influence third party observers' retributive 
intentions towards the organization and the union, as well as support for the union?
OtAgr factory
Distributive and procedural justice, the type of dispute, and the sector are but a 
few factors that can influence whether an individual will have any retributive intentions 
towards organizations and unions who are undergoing labor disputes.
Obviously, when encountering a labor dispute there are many factors that may 
influence an individuals' judgment. One of these may be pre-existing attitudes toward 
unions. Individuals who are pro-union may be unwilling to accept that a union did not 
deal fairly with the employer, while those who are anti-union may be predisposed to 
perceiving the union as unfair. One thing is certain, general union attitudes have been 
found to predict support for strike action (Kelloway et al., 2003). Since these general 
union attitudes may influence perceptions of distributive and procedural justice, 
retributive intentions towards the organization and union, as well as support for the 
union, they must be controlled in a study investigating these justice issues.
f&ycorcA Gooü
This study examines how elements of distributive and procedural justice, the 
types of disputes, and the type of sector presented during labor negotiations influence 
third party observers' perceptions of the employer and the union. More specihcally, the 
study observes how the fairness of the demands (i.e., unfair or fair demands underlying a 
labor dispute), the seriousness of the negotiations (i.e., not seriously or seriously 
negotiating during the bargaining process), the type of dispute (i.e., strive or lockout), and
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the type of sector (i.e. nurses/public sector or construction workers/private sector) may 
influence retributive intentions that third party observers develop towards the employer 
and union, and to what extent third party observers may be willing to support a strike 
while controlling for union attitudes.
S'MTMTMuy}' o/"
HI : Third party observers will report higher levels of distributive justice for the party in a 
labor dispute whose reasons for its position are seen as fair.
H2: Third party observers will report higher levels of support and lower levels of 
retributive intentions towards the party in a labor dispute whose demands are seen as fair. 
H3: Third party observers who perceive either the union or the employer to use fair 
procedures during the labor dispute will report higher levels of procedural justice.
H4: Third party observers who perceive either the union or the employer to use unfair 
negotiation procedures will offer more support for the party that was treated unfairly and 
express more retributive intentions towards the other party.
The study also investigated the following research questions:
Research Question 1 : Will the type of dispute, a strike or a lockout, influence third party 
observers' retributive intentions towards the organization or the union and their support 
for strike?
Research Question 2: Will the type of profession/ sector, public (i.e., nurses) or private 
(i.e., construction workers), influence third party observers' retributive intentions towards 
the organization and the union, as well as support for the union?
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Method
Participants (^ =  271) in this study were students &om an Atlantic Canadian 
University, recruited with notices placed throughout the campus and transparencies 
presented in classrooms. Respondents were rewarded with a bonus point for a 
psychology class of their choice.
Twenty-three cases were deleted due to responses that did not satisfy the 
manipulation checks. Of the 248 respondents who remained in the study, 158 (64.2%) 
were female and 88 (35.8%) were male. Participants' ages ranged hrom 17 to 55, with 
the mean age of 20.08 years (5D = 5.14). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
(number, age, sex) for participants in each experimental condition. Five of the conditions 
had high standard deviations (e.g., above 5.00). Examination of these conditions found 
one or two outliers per cell. These outliers were not excluded 6om the study, as 
additional analyses found that they did not influence the Gnal results.
Only 29 participants (11.7%) reported being a union member either presently or at 
one time in their lives. Nine individuals (3.6 %) stated that they were previously unable 
to work due to a strike, while 49 respondents (19.8%) declared that they had previously 
participated in a strike (e.g., walk the picket line or hand out brochures for the union), 
frocedwre wzcf Desfgn
Testing took place in a small classroom on campus. The experimenter was 
present during all aspects of the data collection to deliver all instructions pertaining to the 
study. Informed consent was obtained upon the participant's arrival. Once the
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participant signed the written consent, the experimenter gave brief instructions on how to 
properly complete the survey.
Table I
Cell N Age (SD) Sex
M(n) F(n)
1- Fair, Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Nurses 16 19.31 (1.82) 8 8
2- Fair, Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Constr. WorkMS 17 20.06 (2.56) 5 12
3- Fair, Not Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Nurses 14 19.36(1.79) 3 11
4- Fair, Not Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Constr. Workers 15 22.60 (9.68) 6 9
5- Fair, Seriously Neg., Strike, Nurses 14 20.21 (5.79) 5 9
6- Fair, Seriously Neg., Strike, Constr. Workers 15 19.13(1.85) 8 7
7- Fair, Not Seriously Neg., Strike, Nurses 16 18.81 (1.91) 4 12
8- Fair, Not Seriously Neg., Strike, Constr. Workers 16 23.06(11.51) 7 9
9- Unfair, Not Seriously N eg ., Lock Out, Nurses 15 19.13 (1.30) 4 11
10- Unfair, Not Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Constr. 
Workers
18 20.65 (5.60) 5 12
11- Unfair, Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Nurses 16 20.13(5.18) 4 12
12- Unfair, Seriously Neg., Lock Out, Constr. Workers 15 19.00 (2.80) 3 12
13- Unfair, Not Seriously Neg., Strike, Nurses 17 19.94(4.48) 10 7
14- Unfair, Not Seriously Neg., Strike, Constr. Workers 15 19.40(1.92) 5 10
15- Unfair, Seriously Neg., Strike, Nurses 14 19.29 (3.05) 3 11
16- Unfair, Seriously Neg., Strike, Constr. Workers 13 19.62 (2.96) 7 6
A'bZe. 246. Conditions 4, 5, 8,10, and 11 had standard deviations above 5.00. These extreme standard 
deviations are caused by one or two participants in each cell who were over 35 years of age. All analyses 
for this study were completed with these outliers removed and no statistical differences were found.
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Participants were then randomly assigned to one of sixteen experimental 
conditions determined b y a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  research design: the Fairness of the Demands 
(unfair vs. fair) X the Seriousness of the Negotiations (not serious vs. serious) X Type of 
Labor Dispute (strike vs. lockout) X Type of Sector (private/construction workers vs. 
public/nurses). Sixteen different versions of a newspaper article/vignette that 
manipulated all four variables were expressly written for this study (see Appendix A 
through P). Participants read the vignette that applied to their assigned condition. The 
scenarios, designed to resemble short newspaper articles (average of 140 words), gave a 
brief explanation of the labor negotiations, including both parties' demands. All 
information in the articles was kept consistent, other than the information pertaining to 
the four manipulated variables. The Fairness of the Demands was manipulated by 
presenting the participant with one of two situations. In the unfair condition, employees 
were demanding an unreasonable salary increase that would place their salary well above 
the Canadian average: "Presently, the (construction workers/nurses) are receiving $20 
per hour which is below the industry average by $1. Their new demands would increase 
their salary to $25 an hour over the next three years, making their salary higher than the 
Canadian average for (construction workers/nurses)". In the fair situation, their salary is 
below the Canadian average and their demands would place their salary within this 
average: "Presently, the (construction workers/nurses) are receiving $20 per hour which 
is below the industry average by $5. Their new demands would increase their salary to 
$25 an hour over the next three years, making their salary competitive with other 
Canadian (construction woikers/nurses)".
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To manipulate the Seriousness of the Negotiations, participants were presented 
with one of two different situations. In the not serious negotiating condition, 
organizations or unions ofBcials were unwilling to modify their negotiating positions. 
This situation was represented by the following statement: "(Construction 
company/hospital ofBcials or union officials) were unwilling to modify their position 
during the negotiations". In the serious negotiation procedures, both parties seriously 
negotiated and made concessions to try and come to an agreement. This situation was 
depicted with the following declaration: "Although both parties had negotiated seriously 
and have made several concessions over the past week, they were still unable to 6nd an 
agreement".
Participants were presented with one of two different types of labor disputes: a 
strike where the union votes to end negotiations or a lockout in which the organization 
officials see no other option but to lockout its employees. The strike was represented by 
the following statements: "Seven hundred and Gfty (construction workers/nurses) at a 
local (construction company/hospital) have unanimously voted to go on strike due to an 
ongoing labor dispute" and "Union officials believed that a strike was the only way to 
resolve the dispute". The lockout was depicted in the following statements: "A local 
(construction company/hospital) has locked-out 750 of its (workers/nurses) due to an 
ongoing labor dispute" and "(Construction company/hospital) officials believed that the 
lockout was the only way to resolve the dispute". Participants were also presented with 
one of two different sector contexts: (a) construction workers, a private profession, or (b) 
nurses, a public service profession, which was manipulated in each of the previous 
conditions.
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After reading their vignette, participants completed questionnaires designed to 
assess their perceptions of distributive justice, procedural justice, retributive intentions 
towards the employer and the union, their attitudes and level of support towards the union 
and biographical data. No time constraints were placed on participants to complete these 
questionnaires, although it took most individuals about 20 minutes to complete the 
survey. After completion of the survey, individuals were given a feedback form, which 
thanked them for their participation, summarized the research goals, and provided contact 
information.
Düfnhwhve Jiwhce 6'caZe. A six-item scale was developed to assess distributive 
justice for the union and the employer. It contained three questions pertaining to unions 
(e.g., 'The union's demands are fair considering today's labor market") and three 
questions pertaining to the employer (e.g., "Before the negotiations, the organization was 
offering its employees a fair salary"; see Appendix Q). Items were rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (jirongZy cfüagree) to 7 (.yirong^y agree). Since the scale 
contained items directed towards the union and the employer, certain items had to be 
reverse-coded to maintain directionality. Logically, only one party could be perceived as 
fair and the other as unfair. Furthermore, in a negotiation context, usually the union will 
approach the organization with their demands. With this in mind, all items examining the 
organization (i.e. questions 4, 5, and 6) were reverse coded so that high scores on the 
scale reflected higher degrees of distributive justice for the union. The internal 
consistency of the Distributive Justice Scale was (%= .74.
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f  rocecfwraZ Jityrzcg &aZe. A 4-item scale was developed to measure elements of 
Procedural Justice for the Union. This scale had four questions measuring Procedural 
Justice for the union (e.g., "The union used fair procedures during the negotiations"; see 
Appendix R). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging &om l(sfroMg(y 
(Asagrgg) to 7 (sfrong/y agree). High scores represented greater perceptions of 
procedural justice for the union. The internal reliability of the Procedural Justice for 
Union scale was a =  .72.
A 4-item scale measured elements of Procedural Justice for the Organization, (e.g. 
"The organization used fair procedures during the negotiations"; see Appendix S). High 
scores represented greater perceptions of procedural justice for the organization. The 
internal consistency of the Procedural Justice for the Organization scale was a =  .75.
RgrnAwtive JhteMhow towordly rAe E/z^Zqyer SkoZe. Retributive intentions that 
third party observers, as a customer or as a potential employee, may have towards the 
employer were assessed by a 6-item scale (see Appendix T). The scale included two 
items hrom the 5- item employee retributive scale used in Skarlicki et al's (1998) study: 
"If an appropriate job was offered to me in the organization that was described in the 
previous article, I would not accept the position", and "I would look at other 
organizations before applying to the one that was represented in the previous article".
Two items were taken for the Skarlicki et al's (1998) two item customer retribution scale. 
These items included: "Because of the way this organization treats its employees, I as a 
customer would prefer to do my business elsewhere", and "I would have a problem 
recommending this organization to a 6iend or relative". The following two questions 
were developed for the present study: "If I had a 6iend or a relative who was applying for
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a job at the organization described in the previous article, I would advise him or her to 
apply elsewhere" and "I would not be alraid to tell everyone I know to avoid doing 
business with the organization described in the previous article". All six items were rated 
on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from l(.sfroMg^ cfimgreg) to 7 agree). Higher
scores represented higher degrees of retributive intentions towards the employer. The 
internal consistency of the Retributive Intentions towards the Employer scale was (%= .86.
Re/ri6utzve Th/entioTif mwarck t/ze Lhion 6'ca/e. Retributive intentions that third 
party observers may have towards the union depicted in the article were measured by 
using a modified version of the scale originally presented in Skarlicki et al. (1998). The 
original scale was used to measure retributive intentions that individuals may have 
towards a company that was laying off its employees. The present scale was modified to 
a labor context by replacing "company" with "union": "I would look at other unions 
before becoming a member of the one that was described in the previous article", "If I 
could become a member of the union described in the previous article, I would not accept 
the position". An additional item was added to the original scale: "I would have a 
problem recommending this union to a 6iend or family who is searching for a union to 
represent their workers" (see Appendix U). All three items were rated on a 7-point Likert 
rating, ranging hrom l(strong/y (disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflected 
greater retributive intentions towards the union. The internal consistency of the 
Retributive Intentions Member/Union Scale was a  = .74.
5'wRportybr 5'trzAe ^ca/e. Seven items hom the Support for Strike Scale 
(Kelloway, Francis, & Catano, 2003) were used to determine whether participants would 
be willing to support striking unions. The scale measures an individual's intent to follow
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through on various actions that would display support for striking employees. Certain 
questions pertained to passive actions (e.g., "Would you accept literature 6om 
striking/locked-out workers"); while others depicted more active behaviors (e.g., "Join 
the striking/locked out workers on the picket line as a show of support"). The scale was 
slightly modified to correspond with workers who were not only on strike, but also 
locked out. All items were rated on a 7-point Likert rating scale, with responses ranging 
hrom 1 (vg/y unh'^/y) to 7 (ve/y /lAeZy). Higher scores represented higher degrees of 
support for the union. The Support for Strike Scale had an alpha coefficient of .84.
L/hion vfAiWe JcoZe. This 8-item questionnaire, originally developed by Brett 
(1980), was used to identify any positive or negative attitudes that individuals may have 
towards unions. For example, one item asks participants if they believe that unions are a 
positive force in this country. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging 6om 1 
(frro/fg/y f̂ &ragrgg) to 5 (fZro/zg/y ggrgg), with higher scores reflecting higher/positive 
attitudes towards unions. The internal consistency of the Union Attitude Scale was a  = 
.85.
Data. Participants were asked their age, sex, highest level of 
education, and previous work experience. The six-items on past union affiliations were 
incorporated into the study for descriptive purposes (See Appendix V).
Monÿw/ntmn Manipulation checks were included to confirm that
participants correctly understood the vignettes that they read. If participants were 
assigned to a condition that depicted nurses on strike, then they should acknowledge that 
they read a vignette that depicted that situation. To assess if participants understood the 
manipulation, they were asked two questions: "In the article that you have just read.
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were the labor negotiations described as a strike or a lockout", and "Did the previous 
article you just read describe labor negotiations between nurses and a hospital or 
construction workers and a construction company" Individuals who did not correctly 
respond to these questions (e.g., they were assigned to a strike condition, but reported that 
the vignette depicted a lockout) were excluded 6om the study.
Crosstab Analyses/Frequencies were used to conGrm whether participants were 
aware of the diSerent conditions (i.e., type of dispute and sector) that were presented in 
the vignettes. As previously reported, 23 participants were excluded 6om the study due 
to incorrect responses. With respect to Negotiations, 121 participants correctly reported 
reading an article depicting a strike, while 127 participants correctly responded that they 
read an article describing a lockout. With respect to the type of sector, 124 individuals 
correctly responded to reading an article that described nurses in a labor dispute, while 
124 correctly reported reading an article that described negotiations with construction 
workers.
Dam M S'/rategy
Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFAs) were conducted to determine whether the 
measures developed for the present study were actually measuring four distinct variables: 
distributive and procedural justice, retributive intentions towards the employer, and 
retributive intentions towards the union. Crosstab analyses were conducted to confirm 
that the four independent variables were properly manipulated. Pearson correlations were 
used to examine any existing relationships between the variables corresponding to the 
hypotheses. A Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) was used to 
investigate whether the manipulations of the demands, negotiations, type of dispute, and
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type of profession/sector used during the dispute had signiGcant eSects on the dependent 
variables while using scores on the union attitude scale as a covariate/
Results
A preliminary analysis, following guidelines presented in Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001), showed that the database was clean and that no variable required transformation. 
A correlation matrix based on all 23 items used to assess Distributive Justice, Procedural 
Justice for the Union, Procedural Justice for the Organization, Retributive Intentions 
towards the Employer, and Retributive Intentions towards the Union confirmed the 
factorability of the scales; several correlations were above .30 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001).
Factor XMu/ysw
Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFAs), principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation, determined the number of initial factors. For this analysis, factor loadings above 
.40 were considered. There were 5 factors with eigenvalues greater than one. However, 
there was very little variance between the fourth (eigenvalue= 1.36) and Gfth factor 
(eigenvalue = 1.16); furthermore, the scree plot (see Figure 1) indicated that there could 
very well only be four factors.
A second EFA, also using principal components analysis with varimax rotation, 
extracted four factors. The Eve-factor model accounted for 59.22% of the observed 
variance, while the four-factor model accounted for 54.18%. The four-factor model did 
not have any items that cross-loaded, as opposed to the Eve-factor model where several
' Although results 6om the MANCOVA are reported here, a MANOVA was also conducted; there were no 
diGerences between the two analyses.
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items loaded onto more than one factor. Therefore, the fbnr-factor solution was used for 
subsequent analyses. The results of the four-factor model are presented in Table 2.
The four factors were interpreted as follows:
fucro/- 7 contained 6 items related to retributive intentions towards the employer as either 
a prospective employee (e.g., If an appropriate job was offered to me in the organization 
that was described in the previous article, I would not accept the position) or potential 
customer (e.g.. Because of the way this organization treats its employees, I as a customer 
would prefer to do my business elsewhere). The first factor accounted for 22.55 % of the 
total variance.











13 237 9 11 15 17 19 213 51
Component Number
Focior 2 contained 8 items associated with procedural justice (e.g., the union used 
fair procedures during the negotiations). It accounted for 13.75 % of the total variance.
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Factor 3 contained 6 items related to distributive justice (e.g., the union's 
demands are fair considering today's labor market). It accounted for 11.99 % of the total 
variance.
Factor ^ contained 3 items associated with retributive intentions towards the 
union (e.g., 1 would look at other unions before becoming a member of the one that was 
described in the previous article). It accounted for 5.89 % of the total variance.
Table 2











1. The union’s demands are fair considering today’s labor 
market
.16 .08 .71 -.18
2. The union’s demands are realistic considering today’s 
labor market
.26 .09 .68 -.16
3. The union is requesting a fair salary increase .28 .15 .67 -.10
4. Before negotiations, the organization was offering its 
employees a fair salary
.15 -.11 .45 .11
5. Before the negotiations, the organization was offering a 
salary that was competitive to the industry average 
throughout Canada
-.15 -.06 .67 .25
6. The organization is prepared to offer its employees a 
realistic salary considering today’s labor market
-.09 -.22 .57 -.07
7. The union used fair procedures during the negotiations -.07 .57 .30 -.13
8. The union seriously negotiated with the organization .06 .73 .25 -.09
9. The union tried to accommodate the organizations' 
demands during the negotiations
-.02 .68 .20 -.05
10. The union was willing to modify their original offer 
during the negotiations
.19 .63 -.18 -.21
11. The organization used fair procedures during the 
negotiations
-.34 .50 -.15 .21
12. The organization seriously negotiated with the union -.24 .70 -.18 .13












13. The organization was prepared to accommodate the 
unions' demands during negotiations
-.17 .57 -.33 .14
14. The organization was willing to modify their original 
offer during the negotiations
-.10 .68 -.25 -.02
15. If an îpropriate job was offered to me in the
organization that was described in the previous article, I 
would not accept the position
.54 .07 .26 .32
1 6 .1 would look at other organizations before applying to 
the one that was represented in the previous article
.58 .02 .19 .33
17. If 1 had a friend or a relative who was applying for a 
job at the organization described in the previous article, 1 
would advise him or her to apply elsewhere
.70 -.05 .21 .37
1 8 .1 would look at other unions before becoming a 
member o f the one that was described in the previous 
article
.15 .04 -.14 .73
19. If I could become a member o f the union described in 
the previous article, I would not accept the position
.25 -.06 .03 .77
20.1 would have a problem recommending this union to a
friend or family who is searching for a union to represent 
their workers
.26 -.04 -.08 .72
21. Because o f the way this organization treats its 
employees, 1 as a customer would prefer to do my 
business elsewhere
.80 -.16 .12 .12
2 2 .1 would have a problem recommending this 
organization to a &iend or a relative
.78 -.12 .19 .25
23.1 would not be a&aid to tell everyone 1 know to avoid 
doing business with the organization described in the 
previous article
.80 -.14 .01 -.04
The procedural justice factor contained items that related to both union and 
organization, thus this factor was considered to involve two independent factors:
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procedural justice for the union and procedural justice for the organization. Unlike the 
distributive justice scale, which only contained distributive justice for the union (e.g., 
high scores representing higher levels of distributive justice for the union and lower 
scores signifying lower levels of distributive justice for the union), the procedural justice 
scale as is would be unable to determine whether the organization or the union acted in a 
justly manner. With this in mind, an EFA with varimax rotation was set to extract 2 
factors, with all 8 items associated with procedural justice. The analysis reported two 
factors with eigenvalues above 1. Both factors accounted for 57.61 % total variance.
One item (i.e., 'The union was willing to modify their original offer during the 
negotiations") cross-loaded on both factors, however, it loaded more strongly on factor 2 
(.46). The results of the two-factor model of procedural justice are presented in Table 3. 
The two 6ctors were interpreted as follows:
fucior 7 contained 4 items associated with procedural justice for the organization 
(e.g., "The organization used fair procedures during the negotiations")- It accounted for 
41.60 % of the total variance.
Factor 2 contained 4 items associated with procedural justice for the union (e.g., 
"The union tried to accommodate the organizations' demands during the negotiations").
It accounted for 16.01% of the total variance.
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Table 3
Factor /br Exp/orofo/y Focior /br Froce<^wm/ Jwf rfce
Item Procedural Justice for 
Organization
Procedural Justice for 
Union
1. The union used fair 
procedures during ±e 
negotiations
.05 .76
2. The union seriously 
negotiated with ± e organization.
.15 .84
3. The union tried to 
accommodate the organizations' 
demands during the negotiations.
.22 .74
4. The union was willing to 
modify their original offer 
during the negotiations.
.40 .46
5. The organization used fair 
procedures during the 
negotiations.
.69 .07
6. The organization seriously 
negotiated with the union.
.69 .35
7. The organization was 
prepared to accommodate the 
unions' demands during 
negotiations.
.82 .04
8. The organization was willing 
to modify their original offer 
during the negotiations.
.72 .26
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CorreZoA'oyK
Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, intercorrelations between 
variables, and sub-scale item correlations for the dependent variables. Inspection of the 
correlation table suggested several associations that were expected in the hypotheses. 
Correlations between the variables showed a signiGcant positive relationship between the 
fairness of the demands underlying the dispute and participants perceptions' of 
distributive justice (r = .41, < .01). Third party observers assigned to conditions with 
fair demands had reported higher scores on the distributive justice scale than those 
assigned to unfair demands. The fairness of the demands was also signiGcantly 
associated with participants' level of support for the union (r = . 14, p  < .05). Third party 
observers assigned to conditions depicting fair demands had reported higher levels of 
support for the union than those assigned to unfair demands.
There was a signiGcant reladonship between the senousness of the negoGaGons 
and procedural jusGce for the union (r = .41, jp < .01). Third party observers assigned to 
condiGons where both parGes seriously negotiated had reported higher levels of 
procedural jusGce for the union than those who were assigned to condiGons where one 
party, either the union or the employer, did not seriously negoGate. There was a negaGve 
signiGcant relaGonship between the seriousness of the negoGaGons and procedural jusGce 
for the organizaGon (r = -.37,^ < .01). Third party observers assigned to condiGons 
where both parGes did not seriously negoGate had reported higher levels of procedural 
jusGce for the employer than those assigned to condiGons where both parGes seriously 
negoGated.
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Table 4
Afeo/is, DevzutioMf, TMfercorreZatzons, JYem Corre/afionf
Variable 5D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Demands 1.50 .50 1.00
2. Negotiations 1.49 .50 .02 1.00
3. Dispute 1.51 .50 -.01 .03 1.00
4. Profession 1.50 .50 -.02 .01 -.02 1.00
5. Distributive 29.13 5.58 .41** -.10 .08 -.03 (.74)
Justice
6. Procedural 15.20 4.26 .12 .41** -.10 -.01 .14* (.72)
Justice -  Union
7. Procedural 17.91 4.33 .02 -.37** .23** .06 .28** -.47** (.75)
Justice -
Organization
8. Retributive 27.10 6.84 .12 -.12 .27** -.08 .36** -.05 .31** (.86)
Intentions -
Employer
9. Retributive 13.29 3.60 .05 -.10 .07 -.13* -.02 -.14* .00 .44** (.74)
Intentions -
Union
10. Support for 30.07 7.95 .14* .04 .04 .07 J2** .10 .06 .32** .02 (.84)
Strike
11. Attitudes 28.73 4.97 .08 .00 .00 .12 .34** .12 .05 .10 -.28** .27** (.85)
towards Unions
Note. N - 246. Fairness of Demands is coded 1 = Unfair Demands and 2 -  Fair Demands; Seriousness of 
Negotiations is coded 1 = Not Seriously Negotiating and 2 = Seriously Negotiating; Type o f  Dispute is coded 1 = 
Strike and 2 = Lockout; Type o f Sector is coded 1 = Construction Workers and 2 = Nurses. Internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for each scale is reported along the diagonal in parentheses. * p <  .05, two-tailed. ** p <  .01, 
two-tailed
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There was a positive signiAcant relationships between the type of dispute and 
retributive intentions towards the employer (r = .27, < .01). Third party observers 
assigned to conditions depicting a lockout had reported higher levels of retributive 
intentions towards the employer in comparison to those who were assigned to conditions 
depicting a strike. Also, there was a signiûcant relationship between the type of dispute 
and procedural justice for the union (r = .23, p  < .01). Third party observers assigned to 
conditions depicting a lockout had reported higher levels of procedural justice for the 
union than those assigned to conditions depicting a strike. Finally, there was a negative 
signiScant relationship between the type of profession/sector and retributive intentions 
towards the employer (r = -. 13, p  < .05). Third party observers assigned to conditions 
depicting a nurses' labor dispute had reported higher levels of retributive intentions 
towards the employer than those assigned to conditions describing a construction workers 
labor dispute.
A multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) determined if there were 
statistically reliable mean differences on distributive justice, procedural justice, 
retributive intentions towards the employer, retributive intentions towards the union, and 
support for strike scales across the four independent variables: Fairness of Demands 
(unfair vs. fair). Seriousness of Negotiations (not seriously vs. seriously). Type of 
Dispute (strike vs. lockout), and Type of Sector (construction workers/private vs. 
nurses/pubhc) after ac^usting for differences on the union attitude scale. Table 5 displays 
the ac^usted means and standard deviations for each condition in regard to their scores on 
the dependent measures.
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Table 5



















n gD SD M &D M gD M  gD
Unfair 118 26.82 5.22 14.62 4.40 17.98 4.22 13.22 3.24 26.42 6.49 28.75 7.57
Demands
Fair 121 31.39 5.02 15.68 4.12 18.07 4.38 13.37 3.94 27.84 7.15 31.20 8.31
Negotiation
Not Seriously 
Negotiating 123 29.68 5.55 13.47 4.03 19.59 3.90 13.60 3.93 27.93 7.38 29.70 8.43
Seriously Negotiating 116 28.54 5.62 16.94 3.81 16.36 4.06 12.97 3.21 26.31 6.17 30.30 7.60
Lockout 123 29.54 5.21 15.02 4.30 19.08 4.53 13.54 3.62 28.96 6.00 30.37 8.46
Dispute
Strike 116 28.70 5.98 15.30 4.29 16.91 3.72 13.04 3.58 25.22 7.19 30.59 8.17
Constr. Workers 122 29.34 5.34 15.25 4.47 17.70 4.22 13.75 3.37 27.63 6.95 29.54 8.24
Profession
Nurses 117 28.91 5.88 15.05 4.10 18.37 4.35 12.82 3.79 26.63 6.74 30.46 7.81
Note. N =  239
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The results of the MANCOVA indicated the presence of significant multivariate 
differences for Demands (Wilk's A = .81, F  (6, 217) = 8.32,/? = .001), Negotiations 
(Wilk's A = .76, F =  11.72 (6,217),;? < .001), and Type of Dispute (Wilk's A = .83, f  
(6,217) = 7.20 p  < .001), but not for the Type of Sector (Wilk's A = .96, F  (6,217) =
1.38, ;? > .05). There were no interactive multivariate effects between variables. The 
effects for Demands, Negotiations, and Type of Dispute on the DVs, after adjustment for 
the covariate, were investigated through univariate analyses.
Fafroesa q/"Demandk. Table 6 presents the univariate analyses for each of the 
dependent measures. The demands made by either party to the labor dispute, whether 
they were fair or unfair, had a significant effect on distributive justice (F (1,222) = 47.64, 
;? < .001, eta  ̂= .18). Third party observers assigned to conditions where the union had 
made fair demands during bargaining process reported higher levels of distributive justice 
(adjusted M = 31.39, AO = 5.02) than those who were assigned to conditions where the 
union had made unfair demands (adjusted M  =26.82, AO = 5.22), supporting Hypotheses 
1.
The fairness of the demands also affected the third party observers' support for 
the strike (F (1,222) = 4.01,;? < .05, eta^ = .02). Third party observers assigned to 
conditions where the union had made fair demands, offered more support for the strike 
(adjusted M = 31.20, AO = 8.31) than those who were assigned to conditions where the 
union had made unfair demands (actuated M = 28.75, AO = 7.57), supporting Hypotheses 
2 .
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Table 6
o/'Panance q/"a/Z DepgTKZenZ Parzaù/eg on tAe Fazmesa q/"zAe Dg/nanzi;
Source 'ÿ' F P
Distributive Justice 1 1099.04 47.64 .000
Procedural Justice -  Union 1 42.45 2.84 .093
Procedural Justice -  Organization 1 3.41 .24 .627
Retributive Intentions -  Union 1 7.65 .65 .422
Retributive Intentions -  Employer 1 141.84 3.34 .069
Support for Strike 1 239.55 4.01 .047
6^rzozz^ngrj q/'ZVggoZzatzon.r. Table 7 presents the univariate analyses for each of the 
dependent measures. The type of negotiation procedure used by either party, whether 
serious or not serious, had a significant effect on procedural justice for the union (F (1, 
222) = 48.28, p  < .001, eta  ̂= .18). Third party observers assigned to conditions where 
either the union or the employer had seriously negotiated, reported higher levels of 
procedural justice for the union (az^usted Af = 16.94, = 3.81) than those who were
assigned to conditions where either party had not seriously negotiated (adjusted M = 
13.47,57) = 4.03), supporting part of Hypotheses 3.
The seriousness of the negotiations also affected the third party observers' 
perceptions of procedural justice for the organization F  (1, 222) = 44.51,/; < .001, eta^ = 
.17. Third party observers assigned to conditions where either the union or the employer 
had seriously negotiated, reported lower levels of procedural justice for the organization 
(az^usted Af = 16.36,57) = 4.06) than those assigned to conditions where either party had
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not seriously negotiated (ac^ustedM= 1 9 . 5 9 , =  3.90), not supporting part of 
Hypotheses 3. It was anticipated that third party observers assigned to seriously 
negotiating conditions would express higher levels of procedural justice for the 
organization.
To further investigate this result a post hoc comparison recoded negotiating into a 
new variable with three values: (a) both parties seriously negotiated, (b) the 
hospital/construction company did not seriously negotiate, and (c) the union did not 
seriously negotiate. A post hoc comparison was deemed necessary to examine if third 
party observers would report higher levels of procedural justice for the organization when 
they were assigned to one of three groups. Post hoc comparisons using Scheffe's test 
showed that participants assigned to conditions where the union had not seriously 
negotiated during the dispute reported higher levels of procedural justice for the 
organization (M = 18.13,5D = 3.52) than those assigned to conditions where both parties 
had seriously negotiated (M= 16.36,5D = 4.06). For those cases where the employer did 
not seriously negotiate, third parties reported even higher levels of procedural justice for 
the organization (Af = 21.03, &0 = 3.74) than when they were assigned to conditions 
where the union had not seriously negotiated or where both parties had seriously 
negotiated.
The seriousness of the negotiations made by either party during the dispute also 
had a signiGcant main effect on retributive intentions towards the employer (F (1,222) =
4.38, p  < .05, eta  ̂= .02). Third party observers assigned to conditions where either party 
had not seriously negotiated during the dispute reported higher levels of retributive 
intentions towards the employer (at^usted M = 27.93,5D = 7.38) than when they were
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assigned to conditions where either party seriously negotiated (actuated M = 26.31, 6D = 
6.17), supporting part of Hypotheses 4. However, third party observers assigned to 
conditions where both parties had not seriously negotiated did not report greater levels of 
retributive intentions towards the union ( f  (1,222) = 2.20,^ > .05, eta  ̂= .01), not 
supporting part of Hypotheses 4; nor did those allocated to conditions where both parties 
had seriously negotiated offer greater support for strike (F (1, 222) = .26,/) > .05, eta  ̂= 
.00), not supporting party of Hypotheses 4.
The seriousness of the negotiations also affected the third party observers 
perceptions of distributive justice (F (1,222) = 4.86, p  < .05, eta  ̂= .02). Third party 
observers assigned to conditions where either party had seriously negotiated reported 
higher levels of distributive justice (adjusted M = 2 9 . 6 8 , =  5.55) than those assigned 
to conditions where either party had not seriously negotiated (adjusted M = 28.54,5Z) = 
5.62). This result was not anticipated in the hypotheses.
Table 7
jinafyszs o/Z on zAg 5^gnoMsngss fAg ZVggorzah'ons
Source # M5 F P
Distributive Justice 1 112.13 4.86 .028
Procedural Justice -  Union 1 720.48 48.28 .000
Procedural Justice -  Organization 1 642.31 44.51 .000
Retributive Intentions -  Union 1 26.06 2.20 .139
Retributive Intentions -  Employer 1 186.23 4.38 .037
Support for Strike 1 15.67 .26 .609
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q/"DispMtg. Table 8 presents the univariate analyses for each of the dependent 
measures. The Type of Dispute, whether a strike or a lockout, had a significant effect on 
retributive intentions toward the employer (F (l, 222) = 20.54,p  < .001, eta^ = .09).
Third party observers assigned to conditions where the employer had locked out its 
employees had higher levels of retributive intentions towards the employer (ai^usted M = 
28.96,5D = 6.00) than when the employees where on strike (ac^usted M = 25.22, =
7.19), which was anticipated in Research Question 1. However, the type of dispute did 
not affect third party observers' retributive intentions towards the union (F (l, 222) = 
1.67,p > .05, eta  ̂= .01), nor did it affect their support for the union ( f  (1,222) = 1.26,p 
> .05, eta  ̂= .01).
Table 8
q/'Kununcg a// Tanab/gs a» tAg T%pg q/'Düpw/g
Source M9 F P
Distributive Justice 1 48.79 2.12 .147
Procedural Justice -  Union 1 8.15 .55 .461
Procedural Justice -  Organization 1 308.90 21.44 .000
Retributive Intentions -  Union 1 19.71 1.67 .198
Retributive Intentions -  Employer 1 872.82 20.54 .000
Support for Strike 1 75.50 1.26 .262
The Type of Dispute also affected the third party observers' perceptions of 
procedural justice for the organization (F (l, 222) = 21.44, g < .001, eta^ = .09). Those 
who observed a lockout reported higher levels of procedural justice for the organization
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(adjustedM= 19.08,6D = 4.53) than those who observed a strike situation (adjusted M = 
1 6 . 9 1 , =  3.72). This relationship was not anticipated in any research question.
Discussion
The results of this study provide considerable support for the notion that third 
party observers will consider the fairness of the bargaining procedures when they are 
developing their perceptions of the union and the employer. These perceptions can have 
serious implications for unions and organizations. As anticipated, third party observers' 
perceptions of the fairness of the demands, the seriousness of the negotiations, and the 
type of profession can have influence on third party observers' retributive intentions 
towards the employer and support for strike, 
fazmerr tAe Dg/MowZ;
Third party observers were expected to report higher levels of distributive justice 
when the union's requested fair demands during the negotiations than when they 
requested unfair demands. These expectations were confirmed, supporting Hypothesis 1 
and Adams' (1965) equity theory. Adams believed that individuals are more concerned 
about the fairness of the final outcome as opposed to the amount of the final outcome. In 
this study, participants were assigned to one of two conditions and were asked to evaluate 
the fairness of the demands underlying a fictitious labor dispute. As previously 
mentioned, third party observers who believed that the union used fair demands during 
the bargaining process (i.e., employees who were receiving a salary below the Canadian 
average and who are requesting an increase that would place their salary within this 
average) reported higher levels of distributive justice than those who saw the demands as 
being unfair (i.e., employees who were receiving a salary below the Canadian average
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and who are requesting an increase that would place their salary above this average). 
These findings support the notion that third party observers will take into consideration 
the fairness of the demands when they are developing their perceptions of the 
organizations and the union who are involved in a labor dispute.
Third party observers were also expected to report higher levels of support and 
lower levels of retributive intentions towards the union when they were assigned to 
conditions depicting the union's demands as fair as opposed to those who were assigned 
to unfair demand conditions. These expectations were confirmed, supporting Hypotheses 
2 and Sndings found by Kelloway et al. (2003), which reported that third party observers' 
perceptions of distributive justice were a strong predictor of support for strike action. 
Both of these studies indicate that third party observers are more likely to have support 
for strike action if the union has fair demands. This finding was an extension of previous 
research that examined employees' reactions to distributive iiyustice. Past studies have 
shown that there is more likely to be an increase in employee turnover and absenteeism 
(Hulin, 1991; Schwarzald et al., 1992) and a decline in work performance (Cowherd & 
Levine, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) when an employer does not offer its employees a 
fair salary for their work. The present and previous studies have two things in common. 
First, they all emphasize the importance of fairness when employees/third party observers 
are required to develop perceptions of the organization or union. Secondly, they all 
demonstrate that distributive justice has fewer negative outcomes than distributive 
injustice.
ybr frucizce uwf JZasenrcA. Confirmation of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
demonstrate that third party observers will take into consideration the fairness of the
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demands when they are developing their perceptions of an organization and a union who 
are undergoing labor negotiations. These Gndings can have significant implications for 
unions who are preparing or currently undergoing labor negotiations. If unions can 
convey to the general public that their demands are fair and reasonable, they may be able 
to gather greater public support. It may be beneficial for unions to place full page ads in 
local newspapers in the form of a written letter to the public. By using such ads, the 
union is not only increasing public awareness, but they are also eliminating the possibility 
that the media will distort the information pertaining to the negotiations and project a 
negative image of the union in question, which the media has been known to do (Puette, 
1992). Increased public support can be a crucial factor in determining whether a union 
will win or lose a strike (Kelloway et al., 2003). Greater public support for stnkiag 
employees can also put pressure on both parties to resolve the dispute in a more timely 
fashion (Leung et al., 1993), consequently diminishing union members' anxiety towards 
the possibility of a prolonged dispute. Greater public support may also help increase 
striking union members' morale.
In regards to future research, it would be interesting to examine if third party 
observers would actually go through with their intent to support a strike. Although third 
party observers expressed a greater willingness to support strikes for unions with fair 
demands, how many of these individuals would actually be willing to go out of their way 
and support striking employees and/or at exactly what level would they be willing to 
offer this support? This problem is consistent with any study that relies on self-reports 
for measures. Nevertheless, measures that could determine the extent of actual 
supporting strike behaviors would give unions a better of understanding of the publics
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support. Unions who know that third party observers would be more willing to ofler 
active support (e.g., walk the picketing line) as opposed to passive support (e.g., wear a 
strike support pin) may be able to place more pressure on organizations to resolve the 
dispute quickly. From an organizational perspective, it would be beneficial to examine 
how third party observers' react to unions demands if they are perceived as unAir. If the 
organization can convey to the public that the union's demands are unfair and 
unreasonable it may place greater pressure on the union to resolve the dispute more 
quickly.
Third party observers were expected to report higher levels of procedural justice 
when they saw both parties as seriously negotiating than when either party, the union or 
the organization, was perceived as not seriously negotiating (i.e., organization or union 
ofGcials were unwilling to modify their position during negotiations). These expectations 
were confirmed, supporting the first part of Hypotheses 3. The results were also 
consistent with the literature suggesting that when organizations' use fair layoff 
procedures (i.e., providing their employees with regular and accurate information) their 
employees will report higher levels of procedural justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Brockner 
et al. 1990; Folger et al., 1983; Shapiro, 1991). This study successfully replicated these 
findings in a labor negotiation context.
Results did not confirm the second part of Hypotheses 3 which predicted that 
third party observers would report higher levels of procedural justice for the organization 
when both parties seriously negotiated, than when either party negotiated unfairly. 
Surprisingly, results indicated the exact opposite. Third party observers who believed
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that both parties seriously negotiated reported signiScantly lower levels of procedural 
justice than those who saw either party, be it the union or the organization, as not 
negotiating seriously.
In order to clarify this unanticipated result, negotiation which was originally 
coded into two groups (i.e., group 1 - seriously negotiating and group 2 -  not seriously 
negotiating) was recoded into a new variable with three groups (i.e., group 1 - both 
parties seriously negotiated, group 2 - the employer did not seriously negotiate and opted 
to lock out its employees, and group 3 -  the union did not seriously negotiate and opted 
to strike). After recoding the negotiation variable for the post hoc analysis a flaw was 
discovered. The section of the vignettes describing negotiations were originally written 
to describe: (a) both parties as seriously negotiating (i.e., although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have made several concessions over the past week, they were 
still unable to find an agreement), and (b) one party, either the union or the organization, 
as not negotiating seriously (i.e., construction company/hospital or union officials were 
unwilling to modify their position during the negotiations). Although these statements 
successfully described the parties as seriously negotiating, they do not depict situations 
where: (a) the union did not negotiate seriously and the organization opted to lock out its 
employees; and (b) the organization did not negotiate seriously and the union's members 
opted to strike. Because these two situations were not properly described in the vignettes 
for the negotiation variable, it is impossible to determine whether third party observers 
reported greater levels of procedural justice for the organization for locking out its 
employees if in fact the union was not negotiating seriously or if third party observers 
would report greater levels of procedural justice for the union, if the union voted to strike
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when the organization was not negotiating seriously. To rectify this problem, sections of 
the vignettes depicting the variable negotiation would have to re-written to include the 
two situations depicted above and would have to be re-administered to participants. To 
examine the eSect that the flawed "seriousness of negotiations" vignettes may have had 
on the other conditions, a post hoc MANCOVA was conducted with the three remaining 
independent variables. This analysis excluded all variables associated with the 
seriousness of the negotiations condition (e.g., the independent variable seriousness of 
negotiations, and the dependent variables procedural justice for the organization and 
procedural justice for the union). The seriousness of the negotiations condition did not 
have an influence on the other findings. There were no differences in the outcomes on 
the remaining dependent measures 6om those reported for the MANCOVA with the 
inclusion of seriousness of negotiations. All significant findings remained significant.
Results also supported part of Hypotheses 4, which expected that third party 
observers would report higher levels of retributive intentions towards the employer when 
they saw one party, either the union or the organization, as not seriously negotiating, than 
when they saw both parties as seriously negotiating. This finding is consistent with 
Veinotte's (2001) and Skarlicki et aTs (1998) results. Both of these studies found that 
third party observers' reported higher levels of retributive intentions when organizations' 
did not use fair procedures during layoffs. This study replicated similar findings but in a 
labor negotiation context. However, third party observers did not report higher levels of 
retributive intentions towards the union when they perceived that both parties were not 
seriously negotiating, contradicting the second part of Hypotheses 4. These results are 
somewhat puzzling for two reasons. First, third party observers who saw both parties as
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not seriously negotiating reported greater levels of retributive intentions towards the 
employer, but for some reason they did not report higher levels of retributive intentions 
towards the union. Secondly, when third party observers saw both parties as not 
seriously negotiating they reported higher levels of procedural justice for the 
organization, but yet they also reported higher levels of retributive intentions towards the 
employer. It would seem odd that third party observers would perceive the 
organization's procedures as fair, while simultaneously reporting greater retributive 
intentions towards the employer.
There are three possible explanations for these conflicting results. First, third 
party observers may have reported higher levels of procedural justice for the organization 
because they believed that the employer was not given any other alternative but to lock 
out its employees and simply did what it had to do. Although they perceived the 
organization as using fair procedures, they would still not want to work for that 
organization, thus explaining the higher levels of retributive intentions. Secondly, third 
party observers may have displayed greater retributive intentions towards the employer 
since its employees were not receiving a competitive salary to begin with; consequently 
increasing third party observers' retributive intentions. Finally, these results may indicate 
an anti-establishment mentality that is shared by a group of young adults. Third party 
observers may identify themselves more with the employees than with the employer, thus 
explaining why they would report greater retributive intentions towards the employer. 
This explanation is consistent with Klandermans (2002) results, who found that people 
are more likely to participate in a protest when they perceive a group, in which they 
identify with, is being treated unfairly.
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It was also hypothesized that third party observers would report greater support 
for the union when they perceived that both parties seriously negotiated as opposed to 
when they believed that one party, either the union or the organization, did not seriously 
negotiate. There were no signiGcant differences between these two groups, which 
suggest that third party observers may place more emphasis on the fairness of the 
demands as opposed to the fairness of the negotiations when determining if they would 
be willing to support a strike.
Third party observers also reported higher levels of distributive justice when they 
saw that both parties seriously negotiated than when they saw one party, either the union 
or the organization, not seriously negotiating. This relationship was not expected; 
however, Skarlicki et al. (1988) and Veinotte (2001) reported similar findings in their 
research which examined elements of procedural justice. In both of these studies, 
participants assigned to conditions where employees were not given an opportunity to 
voice their opinions during layoff procedures (i.e., procedural injustice) reported lower 
levels of distributive justice than those who were assigned to conditions where employees 
were given the opportunity to voice their concerns. Logically, third party observers who 
saw both parties as seriously negotiating should report higher level of distributive justice 
than those who believed that either party was not seriously negotiating, as perceptions of 
distributive justice are determined by the fairness of the situation.
ybrfrociice oncf TZesearcA. Although there was a minor flaw in 
describing negotiations in the vignettes, this study still provides valuable information to 
unions and organizations. Unions who can convey to the public that they are using fair 
negotiations procedures (e.g., seriously negotiating) are more likely to be seen as being
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procedurally just, which in turn can diminish third party observers' retributive intentions 
towards them. Third party observers who saw both parties as seriously negotiating also 
reported higher levels of distributive justice than those who saw one party as not 
seriously negotiating. Although this study did not show higher levels of support for the 
union, higher levels of distributive justice were found to be associated with higher levels 
of support for the union. Greater public support can be crucial in helping unions win 
strikes (Kelloway et al., 2003) and it also puts more pressure on both parties to resolve 
the dispute more quickly (Leung et al., 1993). As previously stated, it may be beneficial 
for unions to take out fiiU page adds in local newspapers in the form of an open letter 
explaining to the public that they have seriously negotiated by using fair procedures.
Organizations, on the other hand, seem to be faced with a win/lose situation.
Even if third party observers perceived the organization as being procedurally just, they 
still reported greater retributive intentions toward them. These findings could be 
explained by the minor flaw reported in the sections describing negotiations in the 
vignettes. Future research should rectify this problem in order to see how third party 
observers react to all negotiations procedures. Third party observers could be expected to 
report greater retributive intentions towards the party that did not seriously negotiate 
(e.g., the union did not seriously negotiate, so the organization opted to lock out its 
employees). These findings could also be explained by a common anti-estabhshment 
belief shared by young participants. Klandermans (2002) suggested that people will be 
more willing to participate in protest if: (a) they perceive that a group has been treated 
unjustly, (b) they are convinced that their actions can change the situation, and c) they 
identify with the group. If third party observers share this anti-establishment belief and
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perceive an organization as using unfair procedures, it may be more difBcult for that 
organization to recruit new employees and customers, as well as to maintain its existing 
clientele. Consequently, organizations may be forced to invest more money into 
recruitment and selection programs and publicity. Future research should examine 
whether re-written vignettes, as suggested above, would rectify these findings or if 
organizations can develop some type of damage control campaign aimed at diminishing 
these retributive intentions, 
q/'Dwpwtg
With respect to Research Question 1, results indicated that the type of dispute, 
either a strike or a lockout, would have an influence on third party observers' retributive 
intentions towards the employer or the union and their support for the union. Participants 
assigned to conditions where the organization locked out its employees reported higher 
levels of retributive intentions towards the employer than those who were assigned to 
conditions where the employees were on strike. Participants may have reported higher 
levels of retributive intentions towards the employer because the employer was not 
offering its employees a fair salary that was within the Canadian average to begin with.
It is also possible that participants reported greater retributive intentions towards the 
employer because they perceived the organization as being responsible for putting a large 
number of employees out of work for an undisclosed amount of time. Since the majority 
of the union's employees had to vote to go on strike, participants may have perceived the 
employees working conditions or salaries to be so unbearable that they had no other 
option but to strike, consequently creating higher retributive intention towards the 
employer and lower retributive intentions towards the union. It is also possible that third
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party observers did not expect the employer to lock out its employees, therefore making 
third party observers report greater retributive intentions towards the employer.
Organizational procedural justice was higher when the organization locked out its 
employees than when the union opted to strike. However, retributive intentions towards 
the employer who locked out its employees were greater than those towards the union, 
establishing that third party observers may express greater retributive intentions for a 
lockout than a strike. Perhaps third party observers simply perceived that the employer 
did what it had to do and acted in a fair manner given the situation. The type of dispute 
did not have any effect on the support for strike scale. Participants probably placed more 
weight on the fairness of the demands rather than the type of dispute when determining if 
they would be willing to support for strike.
fbzp/fcario/zsybr PYacrice aW J(esearcA. Although exploratory, support for 
Research Question 1 demonstrates that third party observers report higher levels of 
procedural justice and retributive intentions towards the organization when it locks out its 
employees. Again, these Gndings support the notion that third party observers may 
possess greater anti-estabhshment beliefs against organizations that are perceived as 
treating their employees unjustly. Organizations should become conscientious of these 
behefs and try to create pubhcity campaigns that emphasize how well they treat their 
employees. In other words, although the organization may not be perceived as treating 
their employees unfairly during the negotiation procedure, it does not necessarily mean 
that they always treat their employees unjustly. Companies may wish to develop public 
awareness campaigns during negotiation procedures that highhght their employees' 
benefits. It may also be benehcial for organizations to examine how third party observers
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develop these anti-establishment beliefs. Future research could even examine if third 
party observers would report lower retributive intentions towards the employer if they 
had a greater understanding of lockout procedures. Perhaps third party observers with a 
greater understanding of bargaining procedures would not perceive the organizations 
actions as being unjust.
With respect to Research Question 2, the type of profession/ sector, private or 
public, did not have an influence on third party observers' retributive intentions towards 
the organization and the union, as well as support for strike. More likely, intentions to 
support or not support an organization or a union are based on the fairness of the 
demands and the seriousness of the negotiations as opposed to the type of profession. 
Third public observers are familiar with nurses because they have obviously been assisted 
by one in the past. It would be interesting to examine how third party observers would 
react to an employee 6om the public service sector who has less visibility than a nurse, 
for example a federal government employee who works a white collar job in an ofBce.
Potential Limitations of Research 
This study had few limitations which must be addressed in order for individuals to 
completely understand the accuracy of its Gndings. First and foremost, the sections 
describing negotiations in the vignettes would have to be re-written to include the two 
situations previously discussed (e.g., union had not seriously negotiated, organization 
opted to lock out its employees; and organization had not seriously negotiated, union 
voted to strike). It was a minor error that these two conditions were not included in the 
vignettes; however, as previously stated this error only influences results associated with
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the seriousness of the negotiations variables. By including these two additional 
descriptions in the segments of the vignettes describing negotiations, it wül be possible to 
examine whether third party observers report greater levels of retributive intentions 
toward the party that did not negotiate seriously and if they would also report greater 
levels of support for the party that was treated unfairly.
Secondly, this study used 16 different vignettes which were developed for the 
present study in order to control for the 4 independent variables. The vignettes described 
a fictitious labor negotiation scenario. Participants only read the vignette once, which 
may not have given them sufficient information or time to develop a well founded 
judgment of both parties involved in the negotiations. During a real labor dispute, third 
party observers would have access to more information pertaining to the strike as the 
media would probably offer negotiation coverage on a daily basis. Third party observers 
would also have a greater opportunity to get different perspectives of the negotiations via 
numerous media outlets, thus giving them a better understanding of the union's and 
organization's perspectives. Third party observers would also have more time to absorb 
the information surrounding the negotiations that is presented to them via the media. All 
of the above could have an impact on how third party observers perceive the union and 
the organization, consequently influencing their decisions to support or to develop 
retributive intentions towards them. However, these problems are common with aU other 
research that use vignettes in their studies. Future research should examine how third 
party observers perceive organizational and union support during a real labor dispute. 
With this type of research, the negotiations would possibly receive more media attention 
over a prolonged period of time, thus making third party observers more aware of all the
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factors surrounding the negotiations. The only problem examining labor negotiations is 
that it is time sensitive as the exact time of a strike or a lockout can be difficult to predict, 
thus making it more challenging to prepare the study, receive ethics approval, and collect 
data before the negotiations end.
Thirdly, the scales used to measure distributive and procedural justice, as well as 
retributive intentions were developed for the present study. Although procedural justice 
was measured via two scales: (a) procedural justice for the union, and (b) procedural 
justice for the organization; distributive justice was only measured with one scale, which 
was directed towards unions. It only seemed logical to measure distributive justice for 
the union since the union was the only party that had made demands (e.g. unfair or fair 
demands) throughout all sixteen vignettes. Furthermore, if distributive justice were 
measured via two scales, both scales would have had internal consistencies below .30. 
Therefore, it was best to measure distributive justice with one scale directed towards the 
union. While all scales developed for the present study had reliability coefBcients 
exceeding the suggested cut-off of .70 (Crocker & Algina, 1986), it may be benehcial to 
develop specific scales that are validated to measure these variables. This would 
diminish the problem of conducting more than one factor analyses.
Fourthly, the type of sector, either public (i.e., nurses) or private (i.e., construction 
workers), did not have an influence on third party observers' perceptions of the 
organization and union. However, there is a possibility that the professions chosen for 
the present study (e.g., nurses and construction workers) may not have been 
representative of a real public or private labor dispute. Third party observers may offer 
less support for a profession that is not viewed as positively as nurses, for example postal
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workers. It would be interesting to examine whether third party observers would report 
different levels of support for different types of professions.
Finally, the sample size for the present study was largely composed of female 
participants which could have influenced the results. Females may have been more apt to 
support the party that was perceived as the underdog in the bargaining process. It may be 
beneGcial for organizations and unions to examine whether the type of sex would 
influence public support.
Summary
Overall, this study demonstrates that third party observers consider elements of 
fairness surrounding labor disputes when they are developing their perceptions of unions 
and organizations. Unions who are capable to convey to the public, via the media (e.g., 
taking out full page adds in local newspapers in the form of an open letter to the media), 
that the reasons underlying the dispute is fair, are likely to gather greater support for 
strike &om third party observers. Organizations on the other hand seem to be faced with 
a win/lose situation. Even if organizations seriously negotiate, third party observers are 
still more likely to have greater retributive intentions towards them. These findings may 
be indicating an anti-establishments belief that is shared by university students. It may be 
beneScial for future research to examine whether publicity campaigns aimed at 
diminishing these retributive intentions towards the organization (e.g., damage control) 
would have any effect on third party observers.
Perceptions of Labor Disputes 61
References
ABC News.com (2003). Martha Stewart Indicted: Domestic Diva Pleads Not Guilty to 
Insider Trading Charges, Resigns of CEO of Company. Retrieved August 2"̂ , 
2003 h-om
http://abcnews.go.eom/sections/business/US/marthastewart_030604.html 
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), in
gxpgnnzenW social/)sycAoiogy (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299). New York: Academic 
Press.
Ball, G. A., Trevino, L. K., & Sims, H. P., Jr. (1994). Just and unjust punishment:
Influences on subordinate performance and citizenship, vf ca îcMy q/"Managemeni 
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Appendix A
Fair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a halt:




A local hospital has locked-out 750 
of its nurses due to an ongoing 
labor dispute. The main issue 
surrounding the dispute is salary 
increases. Presently, the nurses are 
receiving $20 per hour which is 
below the industry average by $5. 
Their new demands would increase 
their salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary competitive with other 
Canadian nurses.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over the 
past week, they were still unable to 
hnd an agreement. Hospital 
officials believed that a lockout 
was the only way to resolve the 
dispute. The union and hospital 
officials are hoping that both 
parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix B
Fair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 





A local construction company 
has locked-out 750 of its workers 
due to an ongoing labor dispute. 
The main issue surrounding the 
dispute is salary increases. 
Presently, the construction 
workers are receiving $20 per 
hour which is below the industry 
average by $5. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary competitive with other 
Canadian construction workers.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over 
the past week, they were still 
unable to find an agreement. The 
construction company ofGcials 
believed that a lockout was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and construction 
company officials are hoping that 
both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix C
Fair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a
halt:




A local hospital has locked-out 
750 of its nurses due to an 
ongoing labor dispute. The main 
issue surrounding the dispute is 
salary increases. Presently, the 
nurses are receiving $20 per hour 
which is below the industry 
average by $5. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary competitive with other 
Canadian nurses.
Hospital ofGcials were unwilling 
to modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
believed that a lockout was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and hospital ofGcials 
are hoping that both parties will 
return to the negotiation table 
some time next week.
Appendix D
Fair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt:





A local construction company 
has locked-out 750 of its workers 
due to an ongoing labor dispute. 
The main issue surrounding the 
dispute is salary increases. 
Presently, the construction 
workers are receiving $20 per 
hour which is below the industry 
average by $5. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary competitive with other 
Canadian construction workers.
The construction company 
officials were unwilling to 
modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
believed that a lockout was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and construction 
company officials are hoping that 
both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix E
Fair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a halt:




Seven hundred and fifty nurses at 
a local hospital have 
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issue 
surrounding the dispute is salary 
increases. Presently, the nurses 
are receiving $20 per hour which 
is below the industry average by 
$5. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary competitive 
with other Canadian nurses.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over 
the past week, they were still 
unable to find an agreement. 
Union officials believed that a 
strike was the only way to 
resolve the dispute. The union 
and hospital ofBcials are hoping 
that both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix F
Fair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




Seven hundred and fifty 
construction workers at a local 
construction company have 
unanimously voted to go on strike 
due to an ongoing labor dispute. 
The main issue surrounding the 
dispute is salary increases. 
Presently, the constmction workers 
are receiving $20 per hour which is 
below the industry average by $5. 
Their new demands would increase 
their salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their
salary competitive with other
Canadian construction workers.
Although both parties had
negotiated seriously and have
made several concessions over the 
past week, they were still unable 
to find an agreement. The union 
ofGcials believed that a strike was 
the only way to resolve the 
dispute. The union and
construction company ofBcials are 
hoping that both parties will return 
to the negotiation table some time 
next week.
Appendix G
Fair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Nnrses
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




Seven hundred and 6fty nnrses at 
a local hospital have 
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issue 
surrounding the dispute is salary 
increases. Presently, the nurses 
are receiving $20 per hour which 
is below the industry average by 
$5. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary competitive 
with other Canadian nurses.
Union ofGcials were unwilling to 
modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
believed that a strike was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and hospital ofGcials 
are hoping that both parties will 
return to the negotiation table 
some time next week.
Appendix H
Fair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt:




Seven hundred and fifty 
construction workers at a local 
construction company have 
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issue 
surrounding the dispute is salary 
increases. Presently, the 
construction workers are 
receiving $20 per hour which is 
below the industry average by 
$5. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary competitive 
with other Canadian construction 
workers.
Union ofBcials were unwilling to 
modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
believe that a strike was the only 
way to resolve the dispute. The 
union and construction company 
officials are hoping that both 
parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix I
Unfair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




A local hospital has locked-out 
750 of its nurses due to an 
ongoing labor dispute. The main 
issues surrounding the dispute 
are salary increases. Presently, 
the nurses are receiving $20 per 
hour which is below the industry 
average by $1. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to 25$ an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary higher than the Canadian 
average for nurses.
Hospital officials were 
unwilling to modi^ their 
monitory position during 
negotiations. They believe that 
a lockout was the only way to 
resolve the dispute. The union 
and hospital ofGcials are hoping 
that both parties will return to 
the negotiation table some time 
next week.
Appendix J
Unfair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt:





A local construction company 
has locked-out 750 of its 
construction workers due to an 
ongoing labor dispute. The main 
issues surrounding the dispute 
are salary increases. Presently, 
the construction workers are 
receiving $20 per hour which is 
below the industry average by 
$1. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary higher than 
the Canadian average for 
construction workers.
The construction company 
officials were unwilling to 
modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
believed that a lockout was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and construction 
company officials are hoping that 
both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix K
Unfair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Lock Out & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




A local hospital has locked-out 
750 of its nurses due to an 
ongoing labor dispute. The main 
issues surrounding the dispute 
are salary increases. Presently, 
the nurses are receiving $20 per 
hour which is below the industry 
average by $1. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to 25$ an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary higher than the Canadian 
average for nurses.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over 
the past week, they were still 
unable to 6nd an agreement. 
Hospital officials believed that a 
lockout was the only way to 
resolve the dispute. The union 
and hospital officials are hoping 
that both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix L
Unfair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Lockout & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt:





A local construction company 
has locked-out 750 of its 
construction workers due to an 
ongoing labor dispute. The main 
issues surrounding the dispute 
are salary increases. Presently, 
the construction workers are 
receiving $20 per hour which is 
below the industry average by 
$1. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary higher than 
the Canadian average for 
construction workers.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over 
the past week, they were still 
unable to find an agreement. The 
construction company officials 
believed that a lockout was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and construction 
company officials are hoping that 
both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix M
Unfair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




Seven hundred and Gfty nurses at 
a local hospital have 
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issues 
surrounding the dispute are 
salary increases. Presently, the 
nurses are receiving $20 per hour 
which is below the industry 
average by $1. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary higher than the Canadian 
average for nurses.
Union officials were unwilling to 
modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
believed that a strike was the 
only way to resolve the dispute. 
The union and hospital ofGcials 
are hoping that both parties will 
return to the negotiation table 
some time next week.
Appendix N
Unfair Demands & Not Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt:




Seven hundred and fifty
construction workers at a local
construction company have
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issues 
surrounding the dispute are 
salary increases. Presently, the 
construction workers are
receiving $20 per hour which is 
below die industry average by 
$1. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary higher than 
the Canadian average for 
constmction workers.
Union ofGcials were unwilling to 
modify their monitory position 
during negotiations. They 
beheve that a strike was the only 
way to resolve the dispute. The 
union and constmction company 
ofGcials are hoping that both 
parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix O
Unfair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Nurses
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




Seven hundred and Gfty nurses at 
a local hospital have 
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issues 
surrounding the dispute are 
salary increases. Presently, the 
nurses are receiving $20 per hour 
which is below the industry 
average by $1. Their new 
demands would increase their 
salary to $25 an hour over the 
next three years, making their 
salary higher than the Canadian 
average for nurses.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over 
the past week, they were still 
unable to find an agreement. 
Union ofGcials beheved that a 
strike was the only way to 
resolve the dispute. The union 
and hospital ofGcials are hoping 
that both parties will return to the 
negotiation table some time next 
week.
Appendix P
Unfair Demands & Seriously Negotiating & Strike & Construction Workers
Labor negotiations come to a halt: 




Seven hundred and fifty
construction workers at a local
construction company have
unanimously voted to go on 
strike due to an ongoing labor 
dispute. The main issues 
surroimding the dispute are 
salary increases. Presently, the 
construction workers are
receiving $20 per hour which is 
below the industry average by 
$1. Their new demands would 
increase their salary to $25 an 
hour over the next three years, 
making their salary higher than 
the Canadian average for 
construction workers.
Although both parties had 
negotiated seriously and have 
made several concessions over 
the past week, they were still 
unable to find an agreement. The 
union ofBcials believed that a 
strike was the only way to 
resolve the dispute. The union 
and construction company 
officials are hoping that both 
parties will return to the 




You have just read an article pertaining to labor negotiations. Please read the 
following questions carefully and use the scale that is presented below each question to 
select the most appropriate answer that describes your perceptions or feelings towards the 
labor negotiations
Please use the following key to answer the following questions:
Key:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Mildly Neutral Mildly Agree Strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
1. The union's demands are fair considering today's labor market.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. The union's demands are reahstic considering today's labor market
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. The union is requesting a fair salary increase.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Before the negotiations, the organization was offering its employees a fair salary.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Before the negotiations, the organization was offering a salary what was competitive 
to the industry average throughout Canada.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7




Procedural Justice for the Union Scale
DzrectzoMf : You have just read an article pertaining to labor negotiations. Please read the 
following questions carefully and use the scale that is presented below each question to 
select the most appropriate answer that describes your perceptions or feelings towards the 
labor negotiations.
Please use the following key to answer the following questions:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Mildly Neutral Mildly Agree Strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
1. The union used fair procedures during the negotiations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. The union seriously negotiated with the organization.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. The union tried to accommodate the organizations' demands during the negotiations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. The union was willing to modify their original offer during the negotiations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Appendix S
Procedural Justice for the Organization Scale
DzrectzofW: You have just read an article pertaining to labor negotiations. Please read the 
following questions carefully and use the scale that is presented below each question to 
select the most appropriate answer that describes your perceptions or feelings towards the 
labor negotiations.
Please use the following key to answer the following questions:
Key:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Mildly Neutral Mildly Agree Strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
1. The organization used fair procedures during the negotiations.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2. The organization seriously negotiated with the union.
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. The organization was prepared to accommodate the unions' demands during 
negotiations.
71 2 3 4 5 6
4. The organization was willing to modify their original offer during the negotiations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Appendix T
Retributive Intentions towards the Employer Scale
Direciionf: You have just read an article pertaining to labor negotiations. Please read the 
following questions carefully and use the scale that is presented below each question to 
select the most appropriate answer that describes your perceptions or feelings towards the 
labor negotiations.
Please use the fbUowing key to answer the following questions:
Key:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Mildly Neutral Mildly Agree Strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
1. If an appropriate job was oSered to me in the organization that was described in the 
previous article, 1 would not accept the position.
1 7
2.1 would look at other organizations before applying to the one that was represented in 
the previous article.
1 7
3. If 1 had a hiend or relative who was applying for a job at the organization described in 
the previous article, 1 would advise him or her to apply elsewhere.
1 7
4. Because of the way this organization treats its employees, 1 as a customer would prefer 
to do my business elsewhere.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. 1 would have a problem recommending this organization to a 6iend or relative.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.1 would not be a&aid to tell everyone 1 know to avoid doing business with the 
organization described in the previous article.
1
Appendix U
Retributive Intentions towards the Union Scale
D/rgctzoTW: You have just read an article pertaining to labor negotiations. Please read the 
following questions carefully and use the scale that is presented below each question to 
select the most appropriate answer that describes your perceptions or feelings towards the 
labor negotiations.
Please use the following key to answer the following questions:
Key:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Disagree Mildly Neutral Mildly Agree Strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
1.1 would look at other unions before becoming a member of the one that was described 
in the previous article.
1 4
2. If 1 could become a member of the union described in the previous article, 1 would not 
accept the position.
1 2 3 4 5 6
3.1 would have a problem recommending this union to a 6iend or family who is 





DzrectzoMf : Listed below are characteristics that describe working environments and 
yonr personnel history. Please read the following questions carefully and answer as each 
question as honestly as possible. Remember, all answer will be kept confidential.
1) Are you or have you previously been a union member?
Yes_____No_____
2) Are you working or have you previously worked in a unionized environment?
Yes_____No_____
3) Do you have any family members (e.g. mother or father) who are or who have been a
member of a union?
Y es_____No_____
4) Have you previously been unable to work due to a strike?
Yes_____No_____
5) Have you previously actively participated in a strike (e.g. walk the picket hue or hand
out brochures for the union)?
Yes_____No_____
6) Do you have a family member (e.g. mother or father) who has previously participated




9) Please mark an "X" next to the option that characterizes your highest level of 
education that you have completed thus far.
 Post-graduate degree
 Graduate degree
 Bachelor degree or college degree
 Some university or college
 High school diploma
